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Looking For Bedrock: Accounting for Human
Rights in Classical Liberalism, Modern
Secularism, and the Christian Tradition
C. SCOTT PRYOR*
'Without . .. a justification, the appeal to [human] rights is quite
mysterious."'

"[Wihat faith seeks and sometimes finds is insight into a true
humanism-into the meaning of human dignity. "2
The concept of human rights can be traced back for a few centuries
or even several millennia, depending on one's understanding of the
historical record.3 Discussion of individual rights can be found in the
writers of late medieval times.' As Western Europe moved into the early

modern period, an additional and somewhat broader emphasis on rights
can be found among the political theorists of the Protestant Reformation,
particularly in the Reformed tradition.'
Later yet, a rights-based
approach became central to several strands of Enlightenment
understanding of political order.6
The American Declaration of
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to thank Mike Glodo, Michael Hernandez, Craig Stem, and Johan van der Vyver for their
comments and suggestions and former student Glen Hoshauer for his input. The
research assistance of William Magee was very helpful. The final expression is, of course,
mine alone.
1.

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,

WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES

APPROACH 100 (2000).
2.

GILBERT MEILAENDER, NEITHER BEAST NOR GOD: THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN

PERSON 5 (2009).
3.

See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS,

NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625 316 (1997) ("The idea of natural rights grew

up among Catholic jurists and theologians during the medieval era.").
4. See infra text accompanying notes 11-12.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 20-23.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 27-39; see also RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL
RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 177 (1979) ("It is remarkable how
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Independence, for example, describes the trilogy of life, liberty, and
pursuit of happiness in terms of "unalienable"-human-result rights.'
Since the end of World War II, there has been an explosion of the
What
number of rights identified as distinctively "human."'
presuppositions underlay the historical configurations of the foundation
and extent of human rights? And what accounts exist for current
formulations of human rights?
Contemporary developments in the concept of human rights have
seen several iterations. Consensus on new human rights has become
increasingly difficult, and implementation of successive generations of
human rights instruments has proved increasingly trying. This Article
asserts that a reason for these progressively more intractable challenges
results from the failure to grapple with the very grounding of human
rights. Human rights theories abstracted from real human beings with
their thick historical, moral, and theological conceptions of life are
insufficient. The more abstract the ground for human rights, the less
traction it has for concrete individuals. Harmony on a single account for
human rights is not feasible in this pluralistic age but candid discussion
of the competing presuppositions-including those arising within
religious traditions-can prove helpful. This Article presents one such
account in terms of the Christian doctrines of the creation of human
beings in the image of God and the divine delegation to humans of
authority to rectify wrongs.
Before developing this account, Part I of this Article looks to the
history of foundations of human rights from late pre-modern times to
the late-eighteenth century Founding era in America. The focus of the
discussion of this era will be on two dominant strands of rights talk in
America, Protestant Christian and Enlightenment. From two views
operating side-by-side in the last decades of the eighteenth century,
Part II will examine the contemporary ambivalence of many Christians,
particularly those identified as Evangelicals, about the contemporary
human rights movement. Part III addresses a specifically Christian
foundation for human rights that can dispel some of the concerns of
brief the two great flourits of rights theories were: the first c. 1350-1450, the second c.
1590-1670.").
7. See CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 392 (2007) ("[Tlhe picture of order invoked
in the American Declaration of Independence, which foregrounds the notion of
inalienable rights, was originally placed within a version of . . . 'Providential Deism.'
Human beings were 'endowed by their Creator' with these rights.").
8. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS,
Treaty Status, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. IV-3 (2010); INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Treaty Status, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S IV-4 (2010).
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Evangelicals about human rights. This Article will go on to contrast this
foundation with a leading current non-theistic alternative. The proffered
understanding of the divine delegation of the authority to implement
civil justice is less well entrenched in Christian thought. Nonetheless, it
provides an account for the legitimacy of state action from within the
Christian tradition. This Article will conclude with some thoughts about
the benefits of bringing this specifically religious perspective to bear on
the topic of human rights.
I.
Legal emphasis on subjective rights-positive claims against others
that can be vindicated through legal means as well as zones of immunity
from the power of civil government-has been traced to earlier and still
earlier stages in the Western tradition. Some identify the Enlightenment
as the historical milieu for rights-oriented thinking about social and
political life.10 Other scholars such as Richard Tuck" and Brian Tierneyl2
have documented the appearance of rights-oriented thinking in late
medieval nominalism and thence to Roman civil law." More recently,
Nicholas Wolterstorff has argued that the notion of rights underlay even
the pre-common era Hebraic approach to law.14 Whatever may be the
historical source of the legal concept of subjective rights, it is clear that

9. See generally Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptionas Applied inJudicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
10. See, e.g., JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 9-14 (2008).
11. RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 13
(1979) ("It was among the men who rediscovered the Digest and created the medieval
science of Roman law in the twelfth century that we must look to find the first modem
rights theory . . . .").
12. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS,
NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAw 1150-1625 43 (1997) ("1 want to suggest that the
humanistic jurisprudence of the twelfth century, especially the writings of the medieval
Decretists, may provide a better starting point for investigating the origins of natural
rights theories . . . .").

13. See JOHN WITTE, GOD'S JOUST, GOD'S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN
TRADITION 33-35 (2006) ("The classical Roman jurists of the first centuries C.E. used the
ancient Latin term ius to identify right in both its objective and subjective senses. . . . The
classical Roman law also referred to subjective rights using the Latin term libertas, which
roughly translates as liberty.").
14. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS 167 (2008) ("[I]nherent
rights were assumed and recognized by the writers of the Hebrew and Christian
Scriptures.").
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by the late eighteenth century they occupied a central place in legal and
political thought in America.15
Charles Taylor describes two dominant presuppositions underlying
conceptions of the moral order in pre-modern Western Europe. The
first, particularly strong in English thought, was "based on the idea of
the Law of a people, which [had] governed this people since time out of
mind."'6 At some time in the primordial past a "people" had been
constituted. This original and ancient constitution assigned various
rights to rules and subjects, which subsequent historical events may
have modified, but against which all subsequent political and
governmental actions could be measured." An alternative understanding
of the fundamental moral order was "organized around a notion of
hierarchy in society which expressed and corresponded to a hierarchy in
the cosmos."'" Tuck and Tierney have demonstrated that both premodern conceptions of the moral order were hospitable to the notion of
individual rights."
Transitioning from the pre-modern to the early modern era, broadly
distributed and legally enforceable rights also found substantial
grounding in the post-Reformation Protestant tradition. 0 Writers in the
Reformed tradition did not reject the earlier views of the moral order.
Nevertheless, for these writers, the foundation for rights was directly
from the Divine. God had imposed certain duties on all human beings,
which logically entailed a right to perform them:
The Reformers cast the person's duties toward God as a set of rights that
others could not obstruct-the right to religious exercise: the right to
honor God and God's name, the right to rest and worship on one's

15. The Declaration's trilogy of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness should be
classified as human rights; see MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW
REPUBLICANISM 187 (1994) ("In 1688-89 the most Whiggish of the Whigs were Grotians;
by 1750 or so, they were Lockeans.").
16. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 163.
17. See DAVID OGG, Introduction to IOANNOS SELDENI, AD FLETAM DISSERTATIO li -lvii
(David Ogg ed., 1925) (1647).
18. Id. For a classic discussion of the latter approach see ARTHUR 0. LOVEjOY, THE
GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1936).
19. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
20. See generally JOHN WITTE, THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAw, RELIGION, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM (2007); see also TIERNEY, supra note 12. For
an opposing argument from ignorance see JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 42 (2d ed. 2003) ("We might in principle imagine rights-based
moral theories, but in practice such a category has historically been largely an empty
one.")
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Sabbath, the right to be free from false gods and false oaths. They cast a
person's duties towards a neighbor, in turn, as the neighbor's right to
have that duty discharged. 2'
Rights in the Protestant tradition were the converse of biblically
mandated duties. Most of the magisterial and later scholastic Protestant
theologians looked to the Decalogue for a precis of such duties. 2 A few,
following rabbinic tradition, looked to the Noahic covenant.2 The
Reformed rights-as-obverse-of-duties approach was not understood
narrowly. Indeed, it was consistent with a notion of personal liberty." As
the drafters of the Westminster Confession of Faith put it in 1647, "God
alone is Lord of the conscience, and has left it free from the doctrines
and commandments of men, which are, in any thing, contrary to His
Word; or beside it, if matters of faith, or worship."2 ' A robust
understanding of Christian liberty pervaded Reformed political
expressions.
Any pervasively historical, metaphysical, or theological foundation
for rights was gradually eclipsed with the developing secular outlook of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There was a shift in
understanding of the foundation of the moral order, at least as it applied
to political society." No longer did elites focus primarily on ancient

21. WITTE, supra note 20, at 29; For evidence that the concept of duty-grounded
rights remained persuasive in England in the late seventeenth century, see the comments
about John Locke in Joshua Foa Dienstag, Serving God and Mammon: The Lochean
Sympathy in Early American Political Thought, 90 AM. POLIT. Sci. REV. 497, 503 (1996)
("One does not seek freedom from absolute government in order to pursue one's wants
but to fulfill one's duties.").
22. Id. at 333 ("Within a generation after Calvin, his followers had flipped these
Decalogue duties in Decalogue-based rights.").
23. See JAMES R. JACOB, HENRY STUBBE: RADICAL PROTESTANTISM AND THE EARLY
ENLIGHTENMENT 134 (1983) (Selden's scholarship was chiefly responsible for supplying
Stubbe with his model for natural religion, the precepts of Noah .... ); see also infra text
accompanying notes 129-33.
24. See WITTE, supra note 20, at 122-34 (discussing Theodore Beza's expansion of
rights, particularly the right of resistance, from John Calvin); id. at 176-96 (discussing
greater expansion and specification of rights by Johannes Althusius).
25. WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, reprinted in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF
CHRISTENDOM 6 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1877) (1647).
26. Indeed, as Brian Tierney observes, "[flrom the twelfth century onward, it was
commonly held that natural law did not only command and forbid, but also left to
humans a wide range of discretionary behavior where they were free to choose their own
courses of action and had a right to act as they chose." Brian Tierney, Historical Roots of
Modern Rights: Before Locke and After, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 23, 37-38 (2005).
27. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 192.
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charters, metaphysical hierarchies, or even divinely imposed duties.
With the rise of what Charles Taylor labels Providential Deism,' God's
place moved from within the political ordering of society to its benign
architect and eschatological motivator:
What remained for God after the "Deist" fourfold eclipse? Still something
significant. God remains the Creator, and hence our benefactor, to
whom we owe gratitude beyond all measure. We are grateful for his
Providence, which has designed our good; but this Providence remains
exclusively general: Particular providences and miracles are out.

. .

. And

he has prepared for us an afterlife, with rewards and punishments. This,
too, is for our good, because it is what motivates us to fulfill his
beneficent plan. 29
A sense of God's immanence faded although belief in his transcendence
persisted.
Thus, at the time of the Founding, God remained important to
American Enlightenment-oriented statecraft as the primary source of
fundamental rights and as the architect of the pattern for a mutually
beneficial society. 0 The substantive content of civil and political rights
in Founding-era America was a melange drawn from the ancient rights
of Englishmen and the deliverances of reason. During this period "the
central moral concern becomes the imposition of a disciplined order on
personal and social life, ensuring high standards of self-control and good
behaviour in the individual, and peace, order and prosperity in
society."31 Understanding the social order in terms of an invisible hand
characterized the Enlightenment approach.32 While God bookended the

28. See id. at 221-24 (describing the "anthropocentric shift" from traditional
Christian orthodoxy to Providential Deism in term of a series of eclipses of longstanding
beliefs in which: humans owe God nothing more than to carry out his plan to achieve
their good; humans do not need God's grace to carry out this plan; there is no mystery in
the design of nature; and God is not planning to transform human beings in a radical
way (at least in this life)).
29. Id. at 233.
30. Id. at 225-26 ("Religion is reduced to moralism [which] in turn was cast in
terms of the modem notion of order, one in which our purposes mesh to our mutual
benefit.").
31. Id. at 260-61.
32. See CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, ADAM SMITH AND THE VIRTUES OF ENLIGHTENMENT 8
(1999) ("The Wealth of Nations clearly influenced thinkers in the American
Founding. . . ."). The invisible hand was an economic one. See also TAYLOR, supra note 7,
at 229 ("The spreading doctrines of the harmony of interests reflect the shift in the idea
of natural order . . . in which the economic dimension takes on greater and greater
importance, and the 'economic' (that is, ordered, peaceful, productive) activity is more
and more the model for human behavior.")). The growing importance of economic
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social order, the divine played little role in the realization of a mutually
beneficial society; the latter was principally a human product.
Early Protestant theologians would have concurred with the
Lockean trilogy of rights-life, liberty, and property 3 -but would have
ordered them to glorify God rather than to maximize human
flourishing." Jefferson's substitution of the pursuit of happiness was a
politic choice. It could be read by those in the historic Protestant
tradition as shorthand for the believer's opportunity to enjoy God's
blessings on earth" as well as an ultimate glorious union with God.36
Yet, its allusion to the pursuit of virtue satisfied those with a more
secular perspective.

harmony can be observed in the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the
Constitution.
33. See, e.g., THE LARGER CATECHISM: AGREED UPON BY THE ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES AT
WESTMINSTER (Dodd & Rumsey 1912) (1648); Questions and Answers 135 and 136
(nesting right of self-defense in series of duties under the rubric of the sixth
commandment); Questions and Answers 141 and 142 (placing rights to engage in a
"lawful calling," to expect good faith in performance of contracts, and to receive
restitution in series of duties under the rubric of the eighth commandment);
WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 25, at 660, Chapter 26.3 (recognizing
right to property).
34. See, e.g., WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, reprinted in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF, THE
CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM supra note 25, at 652, Chapter 23.1 (stating that "God, the
supreme Lord and King of all the world, has ordained civil magistrates, to be, under
Him, over the people, for His own glory, and the public good . . . ."); see also TAYLOR,
supra note 7, at 221. Writing a nearly a century later but reflecting the Old School
Presbyterianism of the Founding Era, Charles Hodge of Princeton Seminary expressed
the subordinate place of human flourishing in the divine economy: "It is unscriptural and
contrary to our moral reason to make happiness the end of creation. The Bible declares
the Glory of God, an infinitely higher end, to be the final cause for which all things
exist." CHARLES HODGE, 1 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 433 (1873).
35. See WITTE, supra note 20, at 92-93 (discussing Theodore Beza's belief that it was
the duty of the magistrate to ensure the subjects' right to happiness).
36. See, e.g., WESTMINSTER SHORTER CATECHISM, reprinted in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF, THE
CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM , supra note 25 at 676, Question and Answer 1: "What is the
chief end of man? Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever."
37. See JAN LEwIS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: FAMILY AND VALUES IN JEFFERSON'S
VIRGINIA xiii (1983):
No one knows what precisely Jefferson had in mind when he asserted "the
pursuit of happiness" as one of mankind's unalienable rights.... No member of
the Virginia gentry would discount the importance, economic or political, of
property, but Jefferson seemed to be moving from a cold acceptance of selfinterest to a more hopeful notion of social felicity, a secular substitution for the
eternal reward.
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The need to reduce high-level principles to rules of action presented
a challenge for those in the developing Enlightenment tradition. If the
purpose of the human political vocation was to identify God's pattern for
human flourishing and to develop a social ordering that would enhance
it, how were the contents of this order to be discovered? As history,
metaphysics, and religion slid into the background, two other resources
came to fore. On one hand, "[tlhis [new political] order was thought to
be evident in the nature of things.

. . .

[Rleason alone can tell us God's

3

purposes." " Reason apart from the redeeming work of Christ and the
sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit was deemed sufficient. The
relationship of God to the interstices of human life was reduced and
reason's place, evidently without the need for divine reorientation,
increased. On the other hand, certain strands of Enlightenment thought
asserted that the rights required for this new order could be identified by
looking within, by examining interior moral sentiments.39
Notwithstanding their differing resources and differing accounts for the
political order, the overlapping concerns of Protestant Christianity and
Enlightenment political thought provided ample common ground during
the Founding period and beyond.
The traditional Protestant understanding of a society ordered
toward the glory of God retained a place during the Founding era' and
"lived on among various Enlightenment Liberal and Civic Republican
schools of American political thought in the later eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries."" Appeals to the older "ancient constitution" found

38. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 166; see also MARTIN E. MARTY, The Virginia Statute Two
Hundred Years Later, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND
CONSEQUENCES 13 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughn eds., 1988) ("Religion, in
the Virginia Statute [for Religious Freedom], is chiefly a cognitive or intellectual, not a
behavioral or existential, matter.").
39. See id. at 258 ("[WIe can have an influential ethical theory in the eighteenth
). See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
century centering on 'moral sentiments' ....
HUMAN NATURE (Dover Publications 2003 (1739-1740)); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS (Knud Haakonssen, ed., 2002) (1759).
40. See WITTE, supra note 20, at 318 ("Many of the basic constitutional ideas and
institutions developed by the Puritans in the seventeenth century remained in place in
the eighteenth century. These ideas and institutions were advocated and adopted not
only in their original forms by Puritan sermonizers and political conservatives, but also
in vestigial forms by those who had claimed no adherence to Puritan beliefs.").
41. Id.; see also Dienstag, supra note 21, at 500 ("Locke links his social contract
model to an ascetic Christian (rather than civic humanistic) account of virtue, and it is
this link that attracts the founders.").
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resonance in the Declaration of Independence. Nonetheless, even while
God's existence and concern for human flourishing continued to ground
human rights in Enlightenment thought, the orientation toward
flourishing defined in terms of a mutually beneficial society and
identification of rights by examining moral sentiments opened the door
for contemporary utilitarianism and intuitionism. As belief in the
bracketing of God's architectonic and eschatological functions eventually
waned, divergence between what are today's Evangelicals and the more
secularized descendants of the Founding's Enlightenment figures
increased.
II.
Consider an apparent paradox: Why do serious people oppose
ratification of a document that clarifies if not expands the scope of
human rights? In the United States, Evangelical Christians"4 have led
opposition to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women.45 Other conservative Christians4 6 as well

42. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [I 11] (U.S. 1776) ("He has made
judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries."); see also DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [11 19] (U.S. 1776)
("For imposing taxes on us without our consent."); See also DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE [cJ221 (U.S. 1776) ("For taking away our charters, abolishing our most
valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our governments.").
43. See infra text accompanying notes 44-68; see also Dienstag, supra note 21, at
509-10 ("By paying closer attention to what links Locke to the founding generation,
however, we see just as clearly what separates that generation from our own. The
principal difference is the Christian foundation for moral and political theory which the
founders assume. What was, for them, an unproblematic premise is, today, probably a
minority position and certainly a highly controversial one.").
44. Identifying what makes certain Christians "evangelicals" is notoriously
challenging. Cf. D.W. BEBBINGTON, EVANGELICALISM IN MODERN BRITAIN: A HISTORY FROM
THE 1730S TO THE 1980s (1988) (defining evangelicalism in terms of biblicism,
crucicentrism, conversionism, and activism) with GEORGE M. MARSDEN, RELIGION AND
AMERICAN CULTURE (1990) (describing evangelicalism in terms of emphasis on the free
individual, education, technique, "back to the Bible" for answers to life's questions, and
social reform).
45. See Jennifer Butler, The Christian Right Coalition and the UN Special Session on
Children: Prospects and Strategies, 8 INTERNAT'L J. CHILD. RTs. 351, 354 (2000) ("These
[Family Research Council, Focus on the Family, and Concerned Women for America]
and other organizations like them have successfully lobbied for the US government to
oppose the CRC [Convention on the Rights of the Child] and CEDAW.").

46. For my purposes, the set of "conservative" Christians includes many evangelicals
plus conservative elements in non-evangelical Christian traditions including conservative
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as Evangelicals have also been vocal in their opposition to adding samesex orientation to the list of federal hate crimes and to expanding the
legal scope of marriage to same-sex couples. Similar voices have been
raised in Australia in resistance to the proposed Charter of Rights. John
Witte has observed that "[olne of the ironies of the contemporary human
rights movement is the relative silence of the modern Protestant
Churches."4 ' Are "religious" people generally-at least Evangelical and
conservative Christian ones-opposed to human rights? Any tension
between Evangelicals and the contemporary human rights movement5 0 is
of relatively recent vintage.
Many Evangelicals and other conservative Christians have pressed
the case for recognition of human rights in places like Darfur and are
working to vindicate human rights through non-governmental
organizations like International Justice Mission and Freedom Firm."
Thomas F. Farr has written that the influence of Evangelicals was
important in passing the International Religious Freedom Act52 and in
pressing the State Department to take seriously the issue of religious
freedom in other countries. So what accounts for such spirited
opposition to certain rights while and strong support for others?

Roman
Catholics.
The original signers of the
Manhattan Declaration
(http://www.manhattandeclaration.org/sign/list-of-religious-leaders-signatories)
exemplify this expanded set.
47. See Lara Schwartz, Ithti Toy Ulit & Deborah Morgan, Straight Talk About Hate
Crimes Bills: Anti-Gay, Anti-Transgender Bias Stalls Federal Hate Crimes Legislation, 7
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 171, 184 (2006) ("Organizations like the Concerned Women for
America, Focus on the Family, the Family Research Council and other groups that have
consistently opposed GLBT-inclusive legislation also oppose a federal hate crimes law.").
48. See Patrick Parkinson, Christian Concerns with the Charter of Rights, SYDNEY L.
SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER 09/72 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465125.
49. Witte, supra note 13, at 84. Witte does not mean that many Protestant Christian
churches do not speak about human rights but that, when they do, they "have been
content simply to confirm human rights norms and to condemn human rights abuses
without deep corporate theological reflection." Id.
50. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, Preface, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAw, POLITICS, MORALS iv (2d ed., 2000) (defining the "human rights
movement" collectively as "post-1945 governmental, intergovernmental
and
nongovernmental developments, in both national and international contexts, in the
recognition and protection of human rights.").
51. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MISSION, http://www.ijm.org/ (last visited Apr. 5,
2011); FREEDOM FIRM, http://www.freedom.firm.in/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
52. See THOMAS F. FARR, WORLD OF FAITH AND FREEDOM 111-33 (2008).
53. Id. at 135-60.
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There are at least three reasons for the inconsistent embrace of the
human rights movement among Evangelicals. First, human rights in the
leading instruments" are expressed in individualistic categories."
Associations, whether natural like the family or transcendent like the
Church, are outside the formal structure of human rights.56 The right of
individuals to form associations garners respect but the rights of
associations-in the terms of the significant human rights
instruments-are purely derivative; individuals have rights to associate
but associations have only whatever rights the local political process
permits." Of course, one can simply note that the adjective "human" by
definition excludes rights of entities such as the family and Church and
that such an exclusion does not entail lack of rights. The rhetorical force
of the virtually exclusive focus on individual human rights, however,
seems destined to make conception of the rights of entities ever more
difficult to comprehend much less recognize.
54. See, e.g., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 1, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (UDHR);
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 8 (ICCPR);
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 8
(ICESCR); CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1981) (CEDAW).
55. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 4 (1990) ("[Tihe idea of human rights
is that the individual counts ....

). Of the human rights described in the three leading

human rights documents (the Universal Declaration of Human rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), only the right to self-determination of peoples is not a right
of individual persons.
56. Id. at 5 ("Human rights, as conceived by and specified in the Universal
Declaration and other international instruments, are the rights of individuals. ...
.[The
essential human rights idea addresses the rights of the individual, not of any group or
collectivity."); see also Steiner & Alston, International Human Rights in Context, supra note
50, at 143 ("Individual rights characterize these instruments. Group or collective rights .
are rare.").
57. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE

14 (1991)

(criticizing concentration

of human rights movement on "the

individual and the state at the expense of the intermediate groups of civil society.").
Others have raised similar concerns about the "state-centric" nature of human rights for
different reasons. See, e.g., Oche Onazi, Towards a Subaltern Theory of Human Rights,
GLOBALJURIST, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2009, at 1 ("[Tihe reality of statist human rights discourse
suggest that it has had a limited impact on the lives of ordinary people.")
58. See, e.g., Matthew W. Clark, The Gospel According to the State: An Analysis of
Massachusetts Adoption Laws and the Closing of Catholic Charities Adoption Services, 41
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 871 (2007-2008); Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire:
How Catholic Charitiesof Boston Was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious
Freedom, 15 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 297 (2008). Even the most recent human rights
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Those who are not fully enamored with the contemporary idea of
human rightS59 may not be concerned only about the absence of entity
rights but about the rationale for certain limits of individual human
rights. Louis Henkin stands for many when he notes that "[ilmplicit
political-moral principles accept limitations on individual rights for the
common good...." o What counts for the common good is, to say the
least, a contested notion. Moreover, once a political system permits
limits on the exercise of human rights by the political process, the risk of
reducing rights to only one factor among many in a utilitarian calculus
will quickly become reality.6 1 For example, the failure of the right to
own property to carry over from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights62 to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
causes concern that the instruments of the human rights movement may
be deployed against politically disfavored individuals or groups. These
contemporary formulations make human rights relative, not absolute.
Third, the incoherence of the proffered foundations for human
rights concerns many. Louis Henkin elaborates the non-foundational

instrument, the CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/newCoreTreatiesen.pdf
(2006),
subordinates the interests of the family to the rights of the disabled individual. See
Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,8 HUM. R. L. REV. 1, 25 (2008) ("The
CRPD privileges the rights of persons with disability over those of family
members. . . .").
59. Michael Perry describes the "idea of human rights" as generally as possible:
[T]here is something about each and every human being, simply as a human
being, such that certain choices should be made and certain other choices
rejected; in particular, certain things ought not to be done to any human being
and certain other things ought to be done for every human being.
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 13 (1998). The idea of
human rights is distinct from the human rights movement. See supra note 50. Quarrels
with the later do not entail rejection of the former.
60. See HENKIN, supra note 55, at 9; see generally ICCPR, supra note 54, Arts. 18, 19,
21, and 22 (couching limits on the prescribed rights in broad and vague categories).
61. Henkin acknowledges as much when he muses that "limitations on individual
liberty or property are to be justified on notions of equity and practicability and some
uncertain blend of the rights idea with utilitarian dedications to the 'general welfare' or
to maximum total happiness." Id. Alarmed by the inconsistency of the notions of rights
circumscribed by appeals to quantitative happiness, Henkin asserts that "[tihe rights
idea, however, rejects the extreme utilitarian position that would justify even the
complete sacrifice of individuals if it would increase total happiness." Id. Henkin offers
no argument for this assertion.
62. See UDHR, supra note 54, Art. 17(1) ("Everyone has the right to own property
alone as well as in association with others.").
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approach of the human rights movement when he writes that "[tihe
international expressions of rights themselves claim no philosophical
foundation, nor do they reflect any clear philosophical foundation, nor
do they reflect any clear philosophical assumptions; they articulate no
particular moral principles or any single, comprehensive theory of the
relation of the individual to society."63 Jack Donnelly simply concludes
that "[there is no strong foundation for human rights

. . .

."6 Yet, it

would seem that providing a foundation for human rights is important at
the least when dealing with those who deny their existence.65 Moreover,
rights untethered to an account of what it means to be human and what
the end or purpose of human existence leads to twin risks: failure to
identify a legitimate human right (or rights bearer) and creation of
putative human rights that are no more than aspirations for a particular
(and perhaps contested) good.6 6 As Don Browning has concluded:

63. Id. at 6; see also Steiner & Alston, International Human Rights in Context, supra
note 50, at 143 ("Both the UDHR and ICCPR are terse about their derivations or
foundations in moral and political thought."). Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE

NEw: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 76 (2001)
(discussing 1947 work of the philosophers' committee of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which reviewed human
rights from many perspectives and concluded that the principles underlying the UDHR
"were present in many cultural and religious traditions") with id. at 77 (noting that the
philosophers' committee "harbored no illusions about how deep the agreement they
discovered went").
64. DONNELLY, supra note 20, at 20. Donnelly completes his sentence with the
following remark: "or, what amounts to the same thing, there are multiple, often
inconsistent, 'foundations."' Id. Observing inconsistent foundations for human rights is
hardly the same as proving that no foundation exists. Donnelly confuses the
psychological with the ontological.
65.

See, e.g., ADAMANTIA

POLIS & PETER SCHWAB, HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1-18 (1979).

66. Donnelly represents many when he uses John Rawls's concept of overlapping
consensus in lieu of an accounting for human rights. See DONNELLY, supra note 20, at
40-41. Donnelly fails to take seriously the point that Rawls was articulating a theory to
justify political liberalism, not moral theory. While POLITICAL LIBERALISM may accurately
describe its subject, it does not explain why liberalism is true. Donnelly brushes aside
this problem as insoluble ("Like all social practices, human rights come with, and in an
important sense require, justifications. But those justifications appeal to 'foundations'
that are ultimately a matter of agreement or assumption rather than proof." Id. at 21.)
and thus irrelevant ("[Tihis is less of a practical problem than one might imagine." Id. at
20.). Many who take their "comprehensive convictions" seriously are not so sanguine
about such a casual dismissal of their concerns. For extended discussions of the use of
liberal concepts like equal concern and respect as ersatz comprehensive convictions, see
Philip L. Quinn, Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious, in RELIGION
AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM

138 (Paul

J.

Weithman
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Today, modern human rights thought ... largely stands devoid of
critical grounding.

. .

. What remains is a list of subjective natural rights

that are asserted more or less independently of any theory of objective
natural rights. They function as an unchecked wish list, in which these
rights increasingly seems to contradict each other, sow seeds of distrust
and disregard among the nations of the world, and get used as tools of
manipulation by various interest groups around the world to accomplish
their own particular political and legal goals.67
For these reasons, there are non-revanchist

elements among

Evangelical and conservative Christians that would eschew the human
rights movement altogether. 8
The failure of the human rights movement to identify a single
foundation may seem inevitable. When the range of potential accounts
for human rights spans from various secular philosophies to inconsistent
religious versions, the possibility of consensus around unified account is
vanishingly small.69 While the development of human rights out of the
Western Christian matrixo is not proof of the validity of that tradition,

Wolterstorff, The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of PoliticalIssues, in RELIGION
IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 67 (Robert Audi ed., 1997).
67. Don S. Browning, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Should
It Be Ratified and Why?, 20 EMORY INTERNAT'L L. REV. 157, 172-73 (2006).
68. See David M. Smolin, Church, State, and InternationalHuman Rights: A Theological
Appraisal, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1515, 1538 (1997-1998) ("[Tlhe language of human
rights will in time prove itself inadequate to the task of expressing Christian concern and
compassion for others, even on a political level. The very language of human rights,
particularly in our contemporary Western context of narcissism, individualism, social
decadence, and religious apostasy, sends the wrong message regarding the relationship of
the individual to society and the human person to God."). The same may be said with
respect to some conservative Roman Catholics. See, e.g., ROBERT P. KRAYNAK, CHRISTIAN
FAITH AND MODERN DEMOCRACY: GOD AND POLITICS IN THE FALLEN WORLD 153 (2001)
("Christianity actually has a deep resistance to the concept of human rights.").
69. See MEIlAENDER, supra note 2, at 90 ("Our most fundamental moral convictions,
precisely because they are fundamental, cannot be deduced from or proven by any more
basic moral truths.").
70. See Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights-Origins and Persistence, 2
NORTHWESTERN J. OF INTERNAT'L & HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2004) ("In presenting the origins and
early history-a sort of "Ur-history"-of the idea of natural rights, I shall necessarily be
describing a Western construct."); see also Zachary R. Calo, Religion, Human rights and
Post-Secular Legal Theory, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1754073 ("That human
rights norms rest, in some sense, on the sacredly tinged language of human dignity
should not be a surprise given the extent to which religious traditions, particularly
Christianity, fed the development of human rights."); Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco,
Towards a Concept of Human Rights: Inside and Outside Genealogy, available at
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exploration of what in that tradition has accounted for the development
of the idea of human rights could prove edifying to participants in other
traditions." In other words, there may be underappreciated strands of
thought or practice within other religious traditions that could prove
helpful in identifying human rights and distinguishing them from other
goods. Moreover, analyzing elements of the Christian tradition that
successfully provide an account for human rights for those within that
tradition may strengthen their commitment to the consistent elements of
the contemporary human rights movement. Of course, opposition by
followers of that tradition will ensue to the extent that contemporary
human rights discourse is inconsistent with a Christian account. While
the prospect of public displays of such fundamental disagreements may
not be pleasing, it is appropriate if only to acknowledge the dignity of all
participants in the human rights discourse.
Ill.
At this point, this Article will focus on the last of the problems
identified above-the lack of a foundation for human rights. This Article
will leave to others the specification of particular inherent human rights.
Analysis of a Christian fulcrum for human rights can prove useful to the
extent that others in the debate are as forthcoming in analyzing the
foundations of their own commitments. Moving from an abstract to a
particular foundation, one grounded in a specific historical and
theological tradition, may also prove helpful in advancing a discussion of
human rights among the growing number of post-secular writers in the
field of human rights."

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1749787 ("Philosophies of human rights [are] loaded with
Kantian or Christian nuances.").
71. See, e.g., ARVIND SHARMA, ARE HUMAN RIGHTS WESTERN? 23 (2006) ("If one keeps
in mind that concepts or ideas developed in a Western context are at best tentative
efforts to penetrate complex realities and that they may not be wholly applicable to moral
and religious traditions elsewhere, this approach can provide an interpretive guide
through diverse religious and moral traditions.").
72. For examples of efforts to develop an account of human rights within other
religious traditions, see ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE
(2008); WILLIAM SCHWEIKER, HUMANITY BEFORE GOD: CONTEMPORARY FACES OF JEWISH,
CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC ETHICS (2006).
73. See, e.g., RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION (2001); BERNARD WILLIAMS, IN
THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED (2005). Both Geuss and Williams focus on the genealogy
of human rights and generally eschew the notion of a universal morality of human rights.
See generally Rodriguez-Blanco, supra note 69, at 6 ("Their aim is to unmask, or unravel,
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A.
More than any other factor, human dignity is cited as the moral
ground of human rights." Yet the assertion of human dignity receives
more attention than an explanation of what accounts for it."
When the question of the foundation of human dignity is
addressed, frequently the exercise of a human capacity for something or
other (typically reasoning) supplies the rationale. 6 Many Evangelicals
are not persuaded that the capacity to reason grounds human dignity.
The profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative
state, and those suffering late-term dementia cannot reason yet virtually

the contingency of our human existence."). With respect to such approaches, Zachary
Calo writes:
The defining characteristic of this project is the shifting of focus from the
universal to the particular. Rather than articulating an account of human rights
on neutral, universal terms, it does so on the basis of particularistic normative
worldviews, including religious traditions. It thus replaces a universal logic
with a theological logic and invites communities of religious meaning to
participate in discourse concerning human rights and human goods without
starting from a secular premise.
Calo, supra note 70, at 18.
74. See, e.g., UDHR PREAMBLE, supra note 54, para. I ("Whereas, recognition of the
inherent dignity ... of all members of the human family. . . ."); see also DAVID KRETZMER
& ECKART KLEIN, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE (2002);
RICHARD AMESBURY & GEORGE M. NEWLANDS, FAITH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CHRISTIANITY AND
THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN DIGNITY xiv (2008) ("The core idea of human
rights-that every human being has dignity . . . "); CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
357 (1994) ("Being in the image of God the human individual posses the dignity of a
person... .").

75. Peter Singer has challenged the "nonsense upon stilts" nature of ungrounded
human dignity. See Peter Singer, A Convenient Truth, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007;
see also Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993 111, 116 (1993) (declaring "human rights
foundationalism" to be "outmoded"); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 142
(Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale eds., 1967) (1888) ("Through Christianity, the
individual was made so important, so absolute, that he could no longer be
sacrificed .

. .

. All 'souls' became equal before God: but this is precisely the most

dangerous of all possible evaluations! If one regards individuals as equal, one calls the
species into question . . . ."); Onazi, supra note 57, at 14 ("The prevailing understanding
of human rights . . . is primarily driven by a western, liberal and individual notion of
dignity.").
76. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 84 (1993) ("The life of a single human organism
commands respect and protection . . . finally, when mental life has begun and
flourishes . . . .")
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all Evangelicals believe such persons retain their human dignity.7 If not
reasoning, then freedom in the Kantian sense of unconstrained choice
supplies a contemporary account for human dignity." Kantian freedom
ultimately proves incoherent.79 Dignity, tethered to abilities such as
reasoning or even the capability to choose, is an under-inclusive
foundation for human rights.
Without a foundation, the limits of "dignity" are cabined by little
more than the imagination of the proponent of some cause or
other-including the human rights movement. "[TIhe use of 'dignity,'
beyond a basic minimum core," writes Christopher McCrudden, "does
not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making
in the human rights context."so Indeed, "there is little common
understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across
jurisdictions."' Even Martha Nussbaum, whose influential work will be
considered later, grounds human dignity in the moral sentiment of awe:
"We see the person as having activity, goals, and projects - as somehow
awe-inspiringly above the mechanical workings of nature .... ."82

77.

NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF,

JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS

329-33 (2008).

78. See, e.g., Rorty, Human Rights, supra note 75, at 124-25. ("Kant's account of the
respect due to rational agents . . . is an excellent suggestion .

. .

. But it has never been

backed up by an argument based on neutral premises, and it never will be.").
79. See C. Scott Pryor, Considerationin the Common Law of Contracts, 18 REGENT U.
see also MEILAENDER, supra note 2, at 28-29
L. REv. 1, 28-29 (2005-2006);
(summarizing argument that an ethical theory founded only upon choice cannot account
for nature of human life); id. at 89 ("The great problem with this approach though is
that, in attempting to salvage personal dignity, it may lose the body and the human
dignity of bodily life.").
80. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights, 19 EUR.J. OF INT'L L. 655 (2009).
81. Id.
82. NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 73. The first half of the paragraph from which this
quote is taken reads as follows:
The idea of human dignity has broad cross-cultural resonance and intuitive
power. We can think of it as the idea that lies at the heart of tragic artworks, in
whatever culture. Think of a tragic character, assailed by fortune. We react to
the spectacle of humanity so assailed in a way very different from the way we
react to a storm blowing grains in the wind. For we see a human being as
having worth as an end, a kind of awe-inspiring something that makes it
horrible to see this person beaten down by the current of chance - and
wonderful, a the same time, to witness the way in which chance has not
completely eclipsed the humanity of the person.
The beauty of Nussbaum's prose should not obscure its foundation in intuition, an
intuition that may not be shared by all. There are certainly many people whose response
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Grounding assertions of the universal and the absolute in in fleeting and
inconsistent human sentiments provides scant support for human
dignity. Assertions of human dignity nonetheless continue to carry
rhetorical weight but as time progresses one can imagine a world in
which dignity's ubiquity will undercut its utility.8 3 Arguments over
human rights create more heat than light.' Only the rhetorical force of
attaching the term "human right" to a particular good is the primary
reason "rights-talk" remains so powerful.
B.
While the heyday of philosophical foundationalism has passed, the
place of foundations continues to play a role in political and legal
discussions. Among virtually all strands within the Christian tradition,
writers about human rights generally and human dignity in particular
have founded their reflections in the theological concept of the image of
God in man.86 Genesis 1:26-27 is the locus classicus for this doctrine:
26

Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. And

let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the
heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth and over every

creeping thing that creeps on the earth."27 So God created man in his
own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he
created them.87

to the vicissitudes of others' misfortune is not awe but malicious glee. See infra text
accompanying note 108.
83. That time may already have arrived. See Steven Pinker, "The Stupidity of
Dignity," in The New Republic (May 28, 2008).
84. See Brad Hooker, Review of JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 30 Ox. J. LEG.
STUD. 193 (2010) ("The rhetorical power of claims made in the name of human rights
seduced many people and groups into stating their moral claims in terms of human
rights. Moral claims made in the name of human rights thus proliferated wildly.
Proliferation was so widespread as to threaten not only to debase the rhetorical power of
the term "human right" but also to blur conditions for appropriate application of the
term. The practical result has been a series of heated but unclear debates.").
85. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 479.
86. See DJ.A. Clines, The Image of God in Man, 19 TYNDALE BULL. 53 (1968)
(surveying various views of meaning of image of God); see also MILLARD ERICKSON,
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 498-510 (1985) (summarizing principal views of image of God in
Christian theology).
87. All quotations from the Bible are taken from the English Standard Version
(2001) unless otherwise noted. Genesis 9:6 is also often cited as a bridge between human
beings as bearing God's image and rights ("Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man
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What does this brief statement mean? The quantity of theological
analysis of this passage from both Jewish and Christian scholars is
overwhelming and inconsistent." Turning to his recent discussion of
inherent moral rights, the efforts of analytic philosopher Nicholas
Wolterstorff can prove helpful."
Wolterstorff begins by analyzing the concept of "a right" and only
later moves to considering a foundation for rights. What makes a
relationship to a particular state of affairs one of right? What
distinguishes that state of affairs that constitutes a good in one's life from
that state of affairs to which one has a right? Put another way, what
makes a wrong? "[To wrong a human being is to treat her in a way that
is disrespectful of her worth," asserts Wolterstorff." What does it mean
to "disrespect" or under-respect someone? The concept of under-respect
presupposes three things. First, the existence of a duty of respect
presupposes that human beings have non-instrumental worth; if they did
not, then rights qua a person's humanity could increase, decrease, or
even vanish with the vagaries of her usefulness. Human rights-at least
inherent ones-could not exist.9 1 In the contemporary world, we would
be thrust to either a hortatory fiat or a utilitarian calculus when asserting
a right. 92 Non-instrumental value of the human subject is an analytic
requirement for an enduring duty of respect.
shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image."). See infra text
accompanying notes 128-133.
88. See, e.g., 1-11 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 93, art. 4, at 471 (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province, Benziger Bros. 1948 (1274)) (asserting that all
humans share in God's image and likeness); id., art. 6, at 473 (concluding that the image
is found in man's mind); JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION I.xv.3, at
186-88 (John T. McNeill, ed., Ford Lewis Battles, trans., 1960 (1559)) (describing
foundation of image of God in man's soul but extending to human faculties, powers, and
even the body); id., I.xv.4, at 190 (rejecting the function of exercising dominion as the
expression of image of God in humans).
89. WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 77. This is not to suggest that Wolterstorff's foray into
this topic is entirely analytic; he devotes several pages to exegetical and historical
theology of the meaning of the expression "image of God." See id. at 342-47.
90. Id. at 296.
91. See Craig A. Stern & Gregory M. Jones, The Coherence of Natural Inalienable
Rights, 76 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 939 (2008) (distinguishing between an inalienable human
right to x and the alienable x, the object of the right). The authors go on to conclude that
the concept of "inalienable rights rel[ies] on the truth of a moral order that is counter to
limitless individual autonomy. Id. at 971. In other words, "natural inalienable rights do
require-presuppose-some transcendent law order." Id. at 972.
92. From a utilitarian perspective, inalienable rights that inhere in one's humanity
do not exist; rights serve only a "boosting' function. If the label "right" is assigned to the
holder's relationship to some good, the utilitarian moral calculus merely increases the
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Second, the existence of wrongs presupposes that certain
(in)actions can have a "respect/disrespect" import; to say otherwise
would deny human agency93 and effectively undercut the existence of
rights. If we do not presuppose that humans act with intentionally, that
is, with a view to bringing about a particular state of affairs, we would
conclude that they lack agency.94 It is because they lack agency that we
conclude that non-agent actors like inanimate objects do not have
rights;95 nor can such objects wrong one who has rights: One cannot sue
the meteorite that obliterates her home. While it is certainly possible
that the quartet of the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a
persistent vegetative state, and those suffering late-term dementia lack
agency, this entails only that they cannot wrong another person, not that
they have no rights.
Finally, a wrong has been committed when the respect/disrespect
import of an (in)action is out of accord with the non-instrumental worth
of the other. In other words, under certain conditions, an agent can act
in such a way as not to respect the worth due another; he can commit a
wrong. If someone has been wronged, she must first have had a right.
Combining these presuppositions, we can conclude that rights are not
utilitarian boosters but trumps. Unlike boosters that add some points to
a utilitarian calculation, one who plays the trump card of a human right
takes the hand: "If I have a right against you to the good of some action
on your part," writes Wolterstorff, "then your performing that action is

holder's entitlement to that good. Thus, if the net of the goods and evils of one's
experience of a state of affairs are positive or at least equal, any agent who denies that
good has committed a wrong. Unfortunately, how to weigh the individual and collective
life goods and evils, how to compare the sums so calculated, and at what point to decide
enough is too much-that my right to a life good is so outweighed as so justify its
deprivation-is exceedingly difficult. Wolterstorff observes that the problem with the
"rights-as-booster" approach is that it undercuts the very notion of rights. Id. at 291-96.
In the utilitarian account, no one has an absolute right to x against which that person's
right to x is to be weighed. Thus, if one's "right" to life-good x can at some point be
overridden by enough goods of enough others, then it is not wrong to deprive that one of
x. And if it's not wrong to deprive one of x, then one never had a right to x in the first
place. Id. ("To deny that human beings have non-instrumental worth is to deny by
implication that they have moral rights . . . ."). At best, the idea of rights-as-booster is
fraught with danger; at worst, it is incoherent.
93. See generally Sarah Buss, "Personal Autonomy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Zalta (ed.), available at
Edward N.
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/entries/personal-autonomy/.
94. See GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 33 (2008).
95. Which is not to say that one who a right to an inanimate object cannot be
wronged by another's (in)action with respect to it.
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to take precedence for you over whatever balance of life-good and evils
might ensue. .. ."96 Without presupposing non-instrumental human
worth, agency, and a relationship between the two, the idea of a human
right-a claim to (in)action that exists at all times in all
circumstances-makes no sense. The balancing that accompanies many
of the putative human rights in contemporary human rights
instruments" demonstrates that they are not rights so understood;
rather, they are goods that political or other entities should endeavor to
safeguard or provide, as the case may be. The relative paucity of
inalienable rights in the Founding era-life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness-demonstrates such a rigorous, analytic understanding of
rights. The amalgam of such rights with other goods characterizes the
contemporary human rights movement.

96. Id. at 291 (emphasis added). The clarity of a right as a trump contrasts sharply
with the concept of rights as boosters when it comes to the perennial problem of
"balancing rights." Human rights cannot be played against other rights; exercising a
human right cannot be a wrong. On Wolterstorffs account there are no set of existing or
potential life-goods that can compromise a human right. Balancing is entirely
appropriate, however, when it comes to allocating goods to which no one has a human
right. Distribution of goods based on consanguinity, propinquity, or mere caprice does
no wrong those to whom the goods were not distributed. Alternatively, the need to
balance rights may reveal an improperly stated right. Vagueness and over-breadth are
common errors in the specification of human rights. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 54, Art.
15(1) ("Everyone has the right to a nationality."); Art. 22 ("Everyone, as a member of
society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization . .. of the economic,
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality."); Art. 24 ("Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay."). See WOLTERSTORFF, supra
note 77, at 315 ("[Tihese are fake rights, pseudo rights."). Wolterstorff takes the
argument that rights are trumps from RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1978). James Griffin has strongly challenged Dworkin's understanding of rights as
trumps. See GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 20. Griffin's observation that rights are often
balanced against the general welfare is beside the point when the rights in question are
not human rights but constitutional, civil, political, legal, or private rights. Following
Wolterstorff, I take the position that only human rights are properly trumps over the
general welfare. Dissenting from Wolterstorff, I do not agree that claims to certain lifegoods such as paid holidays are not rights; they are not human rights but may well be
public or private legal rights.
97. Id.
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C.

1.
Focusing on the third of these factors, what accounts for the
presupposition that human beings have non-instrumental worth?
Historically, reasoning was suggested." Currently we observe that either
the actual exercise of certain qualities (e.g., rational reflection on ends as
well as means99 and application of moral judgments) or the potential to
exercise certain powers are put forward to account for the noninstrumental worth of humans. 00
Following Martha Nussbaum, a leading contemporary human rights
theorist, we can combine both qualities and potentialities into human
"capabilities."'o Nussbaum's approach lists ten such capabilities: life,
bodily health, bodily integrity, sense/imagination/thought, emotions,
practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, and control over one's
environment (political and material).102 Several of these capabilities fit
neatly within the Declaration's list of life and liberty. The others might
be subsumed into the pursuit of happiness.' 3
However, it is clear that not all humans are permitted to exercise
these capabilities. Throughout the world if not in America, poverty and
hunger as well as institutional oppression make it impossible for many
to exercise these capabilities. The failure of a socio-political order to
allow all persons within its scope to develop such capabilities, according
to Nussbaum, is unjust. 104 From the perspective of the capabilities

98. See Jon Wetlesen, Inherent Dignity as a Ground of Human Rights, in REVOLUTION
109-10 (Werner Maihofer ed., 1990) (discussing efforts to include
reason as a ground for human dignity in the UDHR).
99. See GRIFFIN, supra note 10, at 44-48.
100. See generallyWetlesen, supra note 98, at 98-114.
101. Martha Nussbaum has written extensively that human capabilities, not a
particular capacity, ground dignity and hence the universality of human rights. See
NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 5 ("I shall argue that the best approach to this idea of a basic
social minimum is provided by an approach that focuses on human capabilities, that is
what people are actually able to do and to be - in a way informed by an intuitive idea of
a life that is worth of the dignity of the human being.").
102. Id. at 78-80.
103. See Martha Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception"
Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50-53 (2007).
104. See Martha Nussbaum, Reply to Diane Wood, Constitutions and Capabilities:A
(Necessarily) Pragmatic Approach, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 431 (2010) ("A familiar
understanding of the purpose of government is that it should, at a minimum, secure
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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approach, a polity's civil government and not its citizens or nongovernmental entities is ultimately responsible if its people do not have
opportunity to flourish.10 ' This is necessarily the case in Nussbaum's
approach because virtually all non-governmental entities, including the
family, are artifacts of the state. 0 6 Nussbaum demonstrates that a few of
the leading thinkers of the Founding era believed in a role of civil
government to enhance certain capabilities of Americans."'o Nonetheless,
she fails to prove that the view of the Constitutional role of the federal
government in the Founding era included the power to enact a
"capabilities agenda."
Moreover, it is not always the case that it is the failure of the
political order that truncates the full development of a citizen's
capabilities. Some persons simply have no capabilities due to congenital
abnormalities or developmental factors.108 Nussbaum equivocates on the
presence of human dignity and thus the non-instrumental worth of those
whose capabilities are severely stunted.109 Read a certain way, Nussbaum
even could be seen to argue that those who fail to exercise any of these
capabilities are less than fully human."o While decrying both
those central entitlements. If it does not, it will not have a claim to be even minimally
just.").
105. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 24 ("[T]he C[apabilites] A[pproach] holds that
the purpose of government is to promote a set of core necessary conditions for
reasonably flourishing lives . . . . If that purpose has not been fulfilled, government is
ultimately to blame. . . .").
106. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 262 ("The family . . . is the artifact of state

action. . . .").
107. See id. at 103
108. Steven D. Smith subjects Nussbaum's "intuitive" approach as the foundation of
human capabilities to a sustained critique in THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE
171-86 (2010). Even if her list of capabilities can be further substantiated, it falls to the
objection noted in the text accompanying note 77: not all human beings have all of these
capabilities.
109. Nussbaum acknowledges and then dodges this problem when she writes:
At one extreme, we may judge that the absence of capability for a central
function is so acute that the person is not really a human being at all, or any
longer - as in the case of certain very severe forms of mental disability, or
senile dementia. But I am less interested in that boundary (important as it is
for medical ethics) than in a higher threshold, the level at which a person's
capability becomes what Marx called "truly human," that is, worthy of a human
being.
NUSSBAUM, supranote 106.
110. Id. at 87 ("It is perfectly true that functionings, not simply capabilities, are what
render a life fully human in the sense that if there were no functioning of any kind in a
life, we could hardly applaud it, no matter what opportunities it contained.").
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utilitarianism and libertarianism,'11 Nussbaum's emphasis on choice and
the opportunity to choose root her approach firmly among the
proponents of autonomy as the center of what it means to be human. 12
Such a foundation is unacceptable to any who, like most Evangelicals,
are unwilling to conclude that any human lacks non-instrumental worth.
2.
On a distinctively Christian view, however, it is divinely bestowed
(or imputed) worth that accounts for the dignity necessary to justify for
the non-instrumental worth of human beings.113 All human beings are
respect-worthy because, Wolterstorff asserts, God loves them: "I
conclude that if God loves ... each and every human being equally and
permanently, then natural human rights inhere in the worth bestowed
on human beings by that love. Inherent human rights are what respect
for the worth of God's love requires.""
While it is certainly the case that God's love would provide a
foundation for the non-instrumental worth of human beings, some
Evangelicals would balk at Wolterstorff's claim that God universally and
permanently loves all human beings. At the very least, they could
observe that the Bible seems to teach otherwise at some points."' Rather
than pursue this internal argument, however, this Author suggests an
alternative account for God's valorization of human beings that returns
to the key passage in Genesis quoted above. The late theologian Meredith
G. Kline concluded that God's very creation of human beings "with his

111. Id. at 17-24.
112. See, e.g., id. at 10 ("What respect [for human beings] centrally involves . . . is
supporting human beings in the development and exercise of some central human
abilities, especially prominent among which is the faculty of selection and choice."); id.
at 11 ("[T]he most important human powers, including the power of choice. . . ."); id. at
14 ("(6) Centrality of Choice. The goal of CA is capability, because respect for people's
power of choice is at the center of the entire approach."); id. at 15 ("The CA ... aims at a
nation of free choosers . . . . Choice is seen as crucial for citizenship. . . ."). What is to be

made of those who lack the capability to choose is not addressed.
113. See WOLTERSTORFF, supranote 77, at 353 (arguing that being loved by God is the

worth-imparting quality of human beings).
114. Id. at 360. Wolterstorffs use of the subjunctive is puzzling because only a
paragraph later he confirms the reasonable supposition that he holds as true his
assertions of God's universal and permanent love for all human beings. Id.
115. See, e.g., Romans 9:13 ("As it is written, 'Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.'")
(alluding to Malachi 1:2-3); see generally WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note
25, Chapter 32.1 ("And the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in
torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day.").
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image in the beginning was ... to create mankind in a covenant of
marriage, as bride of the Maker-Lord, with all the commitment of
promise and obligation inherent in such an alliance.""' This inherent
moral obligation is bilateral, not unilateral; not only do humans have a
moral obligation to respect God, God, by creating humans in his image,
has a moral obligation to respect them. In other words, by choosing to
create "in his image," justice required that God respect the worth of such
a creature."' It follows that God's respect for his human creation entails
a duty of intra-human respect, which in turn grounds their noninstrumental worth.
In addition to the text of Genesis 1:26-27, Kline makes a second
argument to support his conclusion that the creation of human beings in
God's image entails their non-instrumental worth. He argues that the
presence of God's Spirit at the outset of creation,"s coupled with the
subsequent investiture of humanity with God's image, anticipated the
connection of "enrobing" with the establishment of other covenants
recorded in the Bible."' Much like contemporary judicial robing
ceremonies, enrobing in the Ancient Near East carried significant
cultural overtones.120 Ten of the twenty-seven references in the Hebrew
Scriptures to the noun me'IN (robe, outer garment) occur in the books of
Exodus and Leviticus where it denotes an item of clothing of the high

116. MEREDITH G. KLINE, KINGDOM PROLOGUE 12 (1993) (emphasis added). For an
account of the obligations that inhere in kinship bonds see MEILAENDER, supra note 2, at
16.
117. Kline provides a theological foundation for Wolterstorffs assertion that there
must be reciprocal "standing rights" between God and human beings for there to be a
moral (as opposed to a purely prudential) obligation to obey God's commands. See
WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 77, at 281-84.
118. Genesis 1:2 ("The earth was without form and void, and darkness was over the
face of the deep. And the Spirit of God was hovering over the face of the waters.").
119. See KLINE, KINGDOM PROLOGUE, supra note 116, at 11 ("Before the first creative
fiat is heard in Genesis 1:3, the divine speaker is portrayed in Genesis 1:2 as God the
Spirit . . . . [Tihis form of divine presence is to be identified with the Glory-cloud

epiphany. At the ratification of the old covenant at Sinai, this cloud-pillar form of
theophany represented God standing as witness to his covenant with Israel. Once again,
at the ratification of the new covenant at Pentecost, it was God the Spirit, appearing in
phenomena that are to be seen as a New Testament version of the Glory-fire, who
provided the confirmatory divine testimony. . . ."). The complexity of Kline's prose
points to the difficulty of expressing the doctrine of the image of God in conceptual
form.
120. See, e.g., NICOLAs WYATT, 'THERE'S SUCH DIVINITY DOTH HEDGE A KING:' SELECTED
ESSAYS OF NICOLAS
LITERATURE

WYATT ON ROYAL IDEOLOGY IN UGARITIC AND

OLD TESTAMENT

199 (2005).
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priest.12' Its other uses describe "an outer garment worn by people of
rank."I22 As Kline observes, "[o]ne of the biblical figures for the
bestowing of the divine image on man is that of covering him with a
robe emblematic of God's glory. The outstanding instance of this
symbolism in the Old Testament is found in the placing of the sacred
vestments on the high priest of Israel." 23 Within the Christian tradition,
the metaphorical "enrobing" of humanity with God's Spirit at creation is
consistent with creating humanity in God's image and the unique
valorizing of human beings. Humanity's status as a divinely enrobed race
of priests entails its non-instrumental value. Each human being,
regardless of any lack of capabilities, has dignity sufficient to ground
human rights.
3.
Humanity was created in covenant with God, a relationship with
stipulations with concomitant rewards and penalties.124 The covenantal
form of the divine-human relationship, and not some particular human
quality or power or even capability, frames the concept of "image of
God." Although Kline was not a political theorist, he observed that since
the fall of humanity into a state of sin, "correction" is one of the core
functions of human government (the "city"):

121. See 2 NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY AND EXEGESIS
1018 (Willem A. VanGemeren ed., 1997)
122. Id.
123. KLINE, supra note 116, at 11; see also JAMES B. JORDAN, THROUGH NEw EYES:
DEVELOPING A BIBLICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD 174 (1988) (identifying the robe as emblem
of post-lapsarian judicial authority).
124. Id. at 12 ("In a special sense then, the particular divine fiat to create man as one
invested with the Glory-image of God was a covenantal fiat. [It is] patent that the
covenantal relationship of God and man had its origin in the very act of creating man ...
. The covenantal character of the original kingdom order as a whole and of man's status
in particular was given along with existence itself."). Wolterstorff rejects this
"structural/relational" account of the image of God as the foundation of human dignity.
See WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 77, at 348-52. Notwithstanding his efforts to distinguish
his position from "functional" approaches to the image of God, I believe Wolterstorff
continues to identify the image of God with human functions or capacities. On Kline's
understanding, by contrast, God clothes humanity with his image by divine fiat; it is
what we are, not what we do. For Kline's sustained (albeit recondite) treatment of this
topic see MEREDITH G. KLINE, IMAGES OF THE SPIRIT 26-33 (1980). For an extended
analysis of the same topic in terms of personal dignity from a neo-Aristotelian
perspective see generally MEILAENDER, supra note 2.
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Positive regulation of societal order and direction of cultural endeavor
must now be supplemented by an enforcing of justice through penal
sanctions. As a major means used in his [God's] common grace to
restrain the manifestation of man's depravity, God assigns to city
government the responsibility to act as his agent for the protection of the
community by repressing and punishing evil-doing.125
Because human beings have inherent worth and stand in a structural
covenantal relationship with God, they can be both victims of injustice 2 6
as well as God's agents of correction."'
This Christian account of humanity's creation in the image of God
accounts for the non-instrumental worth of human beings and their
primary human rights. A later text in the Hebrew Scriptures warrants the
exercise of secondary, corrective rights to vindicate violations of primary
rights. Genesis 8:20-9:17 contains what is commonly called the Noahic
covenant in which for the first time in the biblical record there is an
express delegation by God to human beings of the authority to
administer corrective justice. Genesis 9:6 recites that, "Whoever sheds
the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed." Like Genesis 1:2627,12" this text has generated enormous and highly contested
interpretations.129 Following lawyer-theologian David VanDrunen, it will
suffice to observe that "there are good reasons to think that Genesis 9:6
speaks more about human duties than human rights."o30 Human rights
and the human duty of correction or rectification of violations of rights
are linked by the teaching of human beings as the image of God: "God
appeals [in Genesis 9:61 to the image of God not to explain why murder
deserves a severe penalty but to explain why the penalty will be
administered 'by man."" 3' Drawing on Kline's judicial-enrobing
analysis,
VanDrunen concludes that "the appeal to the image in

125. KLINE, supra note 116, at 103.
126. See C. Scott Pryor, PrincipledPluralism and Contract Remedies, 40 McGEORGE L.
REV. 723, 745-46 (2009) (accounting for the appropriateness of state-enforced remedies
for breaches of contract in terms of the Christian doctrine of sin).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 128-32.
128. See supra note 88.
129. See CIAus WESTERMANN, GENESIS 1-11: A COMMENTARY 467 (John J. Scullion
trans., 1984) ("The variations in the interpretation of the verse are striking."). For
examples of varied interpretations see id. at 466-69 and VICTOR P. HAMILTON, THE BOOK,

1-17 315 (1990).
130. David VanDrunen, Natural Law in Noahic Accent: A Covenantal Conception of
NaturalLaw Drawnfrom Genesis 9, 30J. Soc. CHRISTIAN ETHICs 131, 138 (2010).
131. Id.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
OF GENESIS CHAPTERS
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Genesis 9:6 ought to be read as an appeal to the reality of this royaljudicial commission.... When justice is violated, human beings should
exercise their judicial authority to remedy the situation." 3 3 While not as
central in the Christian tradition as the account of humanity's creation in
the image of God, VanDrunen's analysis of this remedial text warrants
Evangelical support for the use of state action to rectify violations of
human rights.
Kline also saw a positive, ameliorative role for civil government. In
other words, the inherent worth of humans requires the state to
remediate as well as adjudicate, to enhance as well as defend, the
covenantally grounded rights of its citizens:
[Als an administrative community it [the state] becomes a welfare
agency burdened with the relief of those destitute by reason of the
cursing of the ground and the general frustration of man's cultural
efforts under the common curse, all aggravated by the selfishness of men
themselves competing in an economy tending to disequilibrium.' 34
There is thus a basis in the standard Christian teaching of creation of
humanity in the image of God for recognition of negative rights (such as
the Declaration's trilogy of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness) as well
as positive claim rights. It is doubtful that this supports state action to
implement Nussbaum's capabilities approach tout court; yet, such a fullorbed view of the doctrine of the image of God warrants discussion of
the positive as well as the corrective role of civil government.
Grounding human dignity in the teaching of the image of God as
embedded in a covenantal relationship between God and human beings
resolves the challenge to Martha Nussbaum.135 As ethicist Gilbert
Meilaender argues, notwithstanding that some humans-the quartet of
the profoundly mentally handicapped, those in a persistent vegetative
state, and those suffering late-term dementia-may lack human
capabilities, which reduces their individual dignity, there is no effect on
their personal dignity.' 3 6 The fundamental covenantal relationship with
God persists regardless of the presence or absence of a person's
capabilities. Bearing the image of God is a permanent status, not a
variable state or condition.
On Kline's understanding, Evangelicals have a theological as well as
exegetical basis on which to affirm the non-instrumental worth of all

133. VanDrunen, supra note 130, at 138.
134. Id.

135. See supra text accompanying notes 101-109.
136. MEILAENDER, supra note 2, at 7-8.
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human beings: They were created in the image of God and that image
remains regardless of the subsequent presence of sin.'3 ' Locating human
dignity in the covenantal-structural image of God rather than in God's
putative universal and permanent love has the virtue of accounting for
the biblical texts describing God's particular and permanent wrath."13
Moreover, the form of covenant described in the Hebrew Scriptures
encompasses elements of stipulations and the related blessings and
curses.139 Justice is inherently part of a covenantal understanding of the
image of God.' In other words, not only are human beings wronged
when another agent acts out of accord with the worth of the aggrieved
person, the other deserves a response fitted to the wrong. Drawing from
the account of the Noahic covenant, the Christian doctrine of humanity's
creation in the image of God accounts both for moral, primary rights and
also secondary rights of correction and rectification. And vindication of
at least some of these secondary rights is appropriately reserved to state
action.

137. See supra text accompanying notes 129-34.
138. See, e.g., John 3:36 ("Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life; whoever does
not obey the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God remains on him."); Matthew
25:41-46; Mark 9:42-48 (quoting Jesus on two occasions describing a place of eternal
torment); see also Romans 2:6-10; Revelation 20:11-15.
139. See, e.g., Genesis 2:16-17 ("And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, 'You
may surely eat of every tree of the garden, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die."'); see KLINE,
KINGDOM PROLOGUE, supra note 116, at 12 ("Conspicuous among the stipulated terms of
the original divine-human relationship were the paired sanctions of life and death, the
curse of death threatened against any breach of fealty and the blessing of life promised
for loyal obedience. Now divine sanctioning is an essential element in covenants"). See
generally MEREDITH G. KLINE, THE STRUCTURE OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY (1989); see also
Leviticus 26; Deuteronomy 28.
140. This observation provides theological support for Wolterstorff's objection to the
divine command theory of rights. See WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 77, at 271-81. As
Wolterstorff correctly observes:
[Piresupposed by the biblical presentation of God as issuing commands to us,
thereby generating in us the moral obligation to obey . .. is the standing moral
obligation on our part to obey such commands . . . and the standing general
moral right on God's part to our obeying such commands . . . . And

presupposed by the biblical presentation of God as making promises to us,
thereby generating in himself the moral obligation to keep God's promise . . is
the standing moral obligation on God's part to keep such promises .. . and the
standing general moral right on our part to God's keeping such promises.
Id. at 283. Standing moral obligations and moral rights inhere in the covenantal structure
and thus in relationship between God and those who reflect God's image.
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The extent of appropriate state authority to rectify wrongs is nearly
as controversial as the question of the nature and scope of human rights
themselves. Consensus on the scope of state authority to ameliorate the
effects of sin is even less likely. Focusing only on correction, however,
few would argue that the state has no place in a scheme for rectification
of wrongs. Yet among those who take seriously the doctrine of the image
of God there is ground for concern about assigning to the modern state
virtually plenary power to remedy all wrongs. While there may be a
presumption that violations of human rights correlate with stateauthorized rectification, it is also the case that, as some non-Western
writers have noted, state-centric rectification of wrongs undermines the
place of intermediate institutions. Atrophy of intermediate institutions
means that in fact there are no remedies for many violations of human
rights because of the lack of state power "on the ground" in many parts
of the world."'
Identifying rights and the jural sphere as the exclusive locus of
human relationships, moreover, cannot fully account for certain
relationships such as marriage and family;"' rights-talk alone cannot
explain the long-standing and "given" nature of such intimate
relationships. Similarly, focusing only on the jural aspect of human
relationships can crowd out other important virtues such as honor,
courage, friendship, and loyalty."

141. See RICHARD AMOAKO BAAH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: THE CONFLICT OF
IMPLEMENTATION 90 (2000) ("Implementation of human rights in traditional societies
without the corresponding structural change across the board, actually defeats the goal
of human rights, as the social order that accorded any level of minimal protection based
on the society's dynamics of human dignity are destroyed without a new order to replace
it."); see also Onazi, supra note 57, at 1 (discussing need for "deep ethnographic
engagement" with the lives of "ordinary peoples" to be able to "understand accurately
why human rights in general have remained elusive to millions across the globe").
Nussbaum acknowledges this problem, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 1, at 25 ("Nations
sometimes have attractive conceptions on paper, without delivering opportunities to
their people in the sense of capability .... ) but fails to credit the power of intermediate
institutions to address it.
142. MEILAENDER, supra note 2, at 26 ("[Tihe language of rights cannot account fully
for the family's importance in human life. A father's rights have not necessarily been
violated if he is unable to feed his children. Nonetheless, his human dignity is
diminished.").
143. See THOMAS K. JOHNSON, HUMAN RIGHTS: A CHRISTIAN PRIMER 22-24 (2008)
(discussing distinction among justice and mercy as well the place of other sometimes
underappreciated virtues in the human rights movement).
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CONCLUSION

The Christian doctrine of humanity's creation in the image of God
provides a foundation for human dignity. Dignity, in turn, is one
element necessary for accounting for human rights. Violations of rights
are wrongs and the same doctrine accounts for rights of rectification.
There are four reasons why this accounting for human rights is
important. First, notwithstanding the widespread skepticism about
foundations in ethics, there are, if the Christian account is true,
foundations for moral claims. That many reject the veracity of the
Christian account can hardly be taken as proof of its falsehood or that
those who follow the Christian tradition should be excluded from
discussing the idea of human rights or participating in (or criticizing)
the human rights movement.'" In any event, a Christian account for
human rights grounds them in a religious tradition whose narrative arc
is far longer than modern secularism.
Next, this account for human dignity-even if rejected by
many-provides a starting point for a multi-party dialogue in which there
can be hope that other traditions will increase their efforts to provide an
account for human rights. Rather than specifying more and more human
rights whose promulgation will prove to be an empty letter, the human
rights movement would be better served by seeking to identify which
claims are truly human rights and which are simply goods. "A new
critical grounding for human rights is required if the entire tradition is
not to explode into scores of conflicting subjective wants that have no
real authority and, in reality can never be implemented.""' This Author
hopes this piece spurs others, whether from modern secular or longstanding religious traditions, to deeper engagement on their part.
Third, finding a foundation for human rights in the image of God
maintains continuity with the best of the Enlightenment tradition, a
The Declaration's
conclusion Martha Nussbaum acknowledges."'
reference to "Nature and Nature's God" was not a throwaway tag line."

144. See MEILAENDER, supra note 2, at 97 ("It is not religious believers who should be
mute in a public square committed to equal dignity; it is others who find themselves
mute when asked to give an account of our shared public commitment.").
145. Browning, supra note 67, at 173.
146. See Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 41 ("[One attractive and enduring marriage
[among the thinkers whose ideas shaped the Founding], compatible with Christian
beliefs, was a combination of the Stoic idea of the equal worth of all human beings with
the Aristotelian idea of human vulnerability.").
147. Nor were the recitals in the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, VA. CODE
ANN. § 57.1 (Michie 2007) (1786) ("Whereas almighty God hath created the mind
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While by the Founding era the Enlightenment tradition had moved from
the earlier historical, metaphysical, and theological foundations for the
moral order, it continued to assert the existence of inherent human
rights, which, in turn, presupposed divinely-ordained human ends or
purposes the attaining of which entailed the freedom to exercise such
rights.14 8 In addition, a full-orbed grounding of the human person as an
image of God justifies not only the negative rights associated with the
Declaration's trilogy of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness but also
provides a foundation for positive human rights. The provisions of the
Noahic covenant go on to supply a biblical justification for State-level
rectification of violations of both sorts of human rights.
Finally, for the Evangelicals whose concerns were noted at the
outset, this Article can provide a theologically grounded starting point
from which to support and critique the contemporary human rights
movement. Many Evangelicals have jumped on the human rights
bandwagon. Others have reacted against some particular expression of
human rights with little substantive consideration. In either case, their
contributions have been primarily political or rhetorical; relatively few
Evangelicals have had a meaningful role in the analysis and critique of
the idea of human rights." 9 This Author also hopes this piece spurs
deeper engagement on their part.

free. . . ."). See also James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298-301 (Robert A.
Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (1785) ("(We hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth,
that religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it,
can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.").
148. See Stern & Jones, supra note 91.
149. For a recent example to the contrary see Gordon Butler, The Essence of Human
Rights: A Religious Critique, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1255 (2009).
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